Building on transaction cost economics theoretical framework, we examined the determinants of long-term business relationships between farmers and buyers in the Albanian dairy chain in a context characterised by weak institutions and lack of formal contract. Logistic regression analysis was employed to test the model on primary data collected from a sample of 315 Albanian farmers engaged in the production of sheep and goat milk. The study results support our hypotheses that trust, uncertainty and levels are discussed. At a managerial level, dairy owners and managers need to build trust with farmers and mitigate uncertainties as a precondition for long-term relationships. At the policy level, the government subsidy schemes need to be further latter being a precondition also to achieve traceability and improve standards.
Introduction
Effective vertical coordination among value chain actors, from raw material producers to distributers, is considered to agriculture sector (Hendrikse, 2007; Reynolds et al., 2009) . Much of the research focused on exchange relationships (e.g. Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2009 ; Jang dinated business relationships. Improved coordination can lead to higher business productivity (Dyer and Singh, 1998) , reduce the uncertainty in food safety demand (Ménard and Olson, 2010) . appear to be clear, building and maintaining such relation ships poses considerable challenges. In the agriculture sec tor, coordination requires the development of sustainable business relationships (Perez et al., 2010; Fischer, 2013) , the mechanisms and key driving forces that shape such rela tionships is of crucial importance. As argued by Williamson (1979) , the type of variation in governance choices can be explained by the characteristics of transactions, thus mainly (a) the level of uncertainty, (b) the likelihood of recurrence In addition to Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) original operates (suppliers, customers and competitors) affects its environment and behaviour, and thereby the type of Van de Ven (1992) point out, exchange partners establish monitoring and renegotiation. Relational norms between exchange partners can develop with the intent of minimising tainty (Dow, 1987) . Trust, as the main social component of relational exchange (Macneil, 1980) , reduces both ex ante and ex post opportunism (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).
relationships (Geyskens et al., 2006) .
Our paper focuses on one of the two dimensions of sus tainable relationships: its durability (Fischer and Reynolds, 2010) . We focus on repeated interactions and transactions (durable) relationships, namely uncertainty, trust and asset developed countries which are characterised by solid mar ket institutions and regulative and legal infrastructure on (e.g. Batt and Wilson, 2000; Fischer, 2013) , less evidence has been collected from developing or transition countries which face higher institutional voids (Bouis and Haddad, 1990) . By testing our model in the Albanian dairy sector with data from a structured survey with farmers engaged in production of goat and sheep milk, we aim to bridge this gap. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, this is nian dairy sector to apply a TCT perspective. We integrate social context into the TCT perspective by explaining how thermore, the operationalisation of some constructs (e.g. characteristics that determine exchange business relation ships with a focus on durability. Theoretical contributions and implication at a managerial and policy level are further discussed.
In the next section of this paper we provide an over view of the dairy sector, focusing on its importance, major trends, actors involved, value chain coordination dynamics and other relevant information. The subsequent literature review considers the role played by uncertainty, asset speci perspective. The later sections cover methodology, analysis of the results, discussions of conclusions and policy and managerial implications.
Blendi GËRDOÇI*, Engjell SKRELI**, Edvin ZHLLIMA** and Drini IMAMI** Determinants of long-term business relationships in the dairy value chain in transition countries: the case of Albania Dairy sector overview tor in Albania as it accounts for about half of the output value of agriculture. Within the livestock sector, dairy produc tion is considered a priority sector for Albanian agriculture and food, particularly for remote rural areas.
Milk production has been growing during the last dec ade: sheep milk production increased by 13 per cent and goat increase in cow milk production for the same period was only 3 per cent. According to Albanian Institute of Statis tics data, small ruminant (goat and sheep) milk production makes up around 15 per cent of the total milk production (the remaining 85 per cent comes from cows). While cow milk is produced throughout the year and is the basis for all types of local dairy products, sheep and goat milk is typically sea sonal and almost exclusively used to produce cheese; the two and kashkaval (hard yellow) cheese. The domestic market compliance with international safety standards.
The milk production, collection and distribution system is still very fragmented and characterised by small farms and dairies. Albanian Ministry of Agriculture data show that, during early 2010s, 85 per cent of farms with sheep had up to 50 heads and the situation is similar for goat farms. There approximately 25 are large processors, processing more than 10 tonnes per day, 220 are traditional, seasonal dairy processing plants relying only on goat milk; however, the number of informal processors might be much higher.
The selected regions (targeted by our survey) account for slightly more than 50 per cent of the total small rumi nant milk production. On the other hand, about half of the seasonal dairy processing units are located in these selected regions (dairy processors of various sizes). For large dairy processing units, it is not possible to delineate the region of supply, as they often buy milk from farms located in other regions too, while smaller/seasonal processors rely exclu sively on local raw milk.
are largely based on spot market or informal agreements; however, other forms of chain coordination are emerging and verbal (informal) types, are more common for green house tomatoes (which have a strong export orientation) than 2017). In the dairy sector, farmers tend to sell directly to pro day), while selling to collectors or other intermediaries is a very rare practice. However, in some regions, large dairies have been building more complex cold chains that include milk collection points. Written contracts between cattle dairy oral agreements are quite common (two thirds of farmers stated that they agree upon them). There are no available data regarding written contracts for goat and sheep milk. safety is becoming a growing concern, particularly for the livestock/dairy value chain (Gjeci et al., 2016) . The causes for the lack of quality and safety standards vary, but one main determinant is the weak coordination in the value chain (Dries et al., 2009) . Despite the slow consolidation trend, the milk production, collection and distribution system is still fragmented and characterised by high levels of informality (from farm, processers, down to retail) and weak monitoring from state authorities, hence resulting in a lack of product traceability. Policy makers are aware of the need to improve supply chain coordination mechanisms and governance. The Albanian Intersectoral Agriculture and Rural Development Rationale and hypothesis development business relationships ments in support of particular transactions with limited value in an alternative use (Williamson, 1985) . The presence of tures that mitigate such risks. Dyer (1996) suggests that the tion and cooperation between business partners. Empirical research in the dairy sector shows that the rise in human, et al., 2006) . Hence, we posit that: • Uncertainty and long-term business relationships relationships with a very diverse effect on governance choices. As Klein (1989, p.256) noted, "It appears that uncertainty is too broad a concept and that different facets reduce transaction costs". Hence, in analysing governance choice, we take into account different facets of uncertainty farmers and their buyers.
Milk producers face environmental and behavioural uncertainty in transactions with their buyers. Local supply and demand mismatch may contribute to price volatility and volume uncertainty (the volume requirements especially behavioural uncertainty too, because of the unbalanced nego tiating power compared to dairy owners, resulting in con tractual (although only verbal) commitment uncertainties. However, these different facets of uncertainty are very often seen by farmers as intertwined with each other. Uncertainty about volumes and price is often linked with opportunistic behaviour of dairy owners (behaviour uncertainty), not to the external market factors, although this might be the case. Hence, in our study, a comprehensive and separate assess ment of the role played by different facets of uncertainty in determining governance choice was quite challenging. How ever, we can hypothesise opposite outcomes depending on the role played by different facets of uncertainty.
Uncertainty can encourage the adoption of hierarchical or hybrid forms of governance as mechanisms to reduce transaction cost, since uncertainty can instigate adaptation stronger when business partners are engaged in recurrent cooperative behaviour can be a proper strategy for discrete exchanges, the expectation of reciprocity encourages busi 1993). As argued by Geyskens et al. (2006) we can expect parties to set up vertical coordination or relational types of governance in order to mitigate opportunism.
Volume uncertainty can also lead to hierarchical forms of ceive the market as unstable in terms of demand volumes, they might experience excess capacity. For milk producers, this situation can result in income loss. Since suppliers' vol suppliers and buyers coordinate with each other, volume uncertainty increases the likelihood for hierarchical govern ance modes to arise (ibid.). From the buyer's perspective, increasing coordination is a way to reduce both food safety risks as suggested by Ménard and Valceschini (2005) and vol
•
On the contrary, some facets of uncertainty can encour ket exchange over hierarchical or hybrid forms of govern ance. Behaviour uncertainty and environmental uncertainty might have this kind of impact on the exchange relationship.
(1993), Suh and Kwonb (2006) On the other hand, high levels of perceived environ mental uncertainty may negatively affect the willingness of exchange partners to invest in durable relationships (Joshi develop temporary relationships only (Ganesan and Hess, the magnitude of the private sanctions that can be imposed argues that an exchange relationship will continue as long as market prices stay within a certain range. On the contrary, if gains of breaching the contract exceed the sanctions, hence, eventually, breaking down the relationship.
Anecdotal evidence from Albania suggests that some dairy owners have (mis)used their stronger bargaining position, mismatch, lowering prices for raw milk. In some cases, they have also changed quality requirements and transport arrangements, leading to uncertainty among farmers. Farm ers that are faced with opportunistic behaviour by a buyer might tend to search for alternative buyers. Even when prices change because of market factors and the change is not attrib uted to the dairy owner's opportunistic behaviour, commit on this line of reasoning, our alternative hypothesis is that uncertainty, both related to market price volatility or buyer's

Trust and long-term business relationships
In general, trust is an expectation into the future behav iour of others; it emerges after positive personal experiences (Luhmann, 2000) . Governance will be enhanced with increas ing levels of trust (Joshi and Stump, 1999) . The expected opportunistic behaviour (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) . On the other hand, relational exchange is often based on informal agreements based on trust and reputation; thus trust serves as a substitute for contracts since the latter are too costly to write, monitor and enforce (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995) . Thus, trust reduces both ex ante and ex post transaction costs by mitigating or eliminating opportunism (Zaheer and Ven katraman, 1995) . Based on this reasoning, we expect trust to affect positively the durability of exchange relationships.
ships based on trust have been found to be an alternative to vertical integration and contracts for the German pork sec tor (Schulze et al tion to formal contracts, are informal safeguard mechanisms adopted by partners in international coffee supply chains. Based on this evidence, our third research hypothesis is as follows:
• - 
Methodology
Measurements
The constructs and the operationalisation of variables are listed in Table 1 and discussed below.
Following Fischer and Reynolds (2010), conceptualisation of sustainable relation and durability, we focus on the latter so as to capture the dynamicity of the relationship. Considering the lack of contractual governance and relational nature of the relation ships, we build on operationalisation of Klein (1996) who refers to relational ties as the degree of a supplier's dedica tion to its buyer. Hence, we use repeated exchange with one or, very rarely, few (no more than two) selected buyers to dairy is seasonal, farmers that produce cow milk (in addition to goat and sheep milk) tend to sell their produce to two dif ferent dairies depending which one is operating in a particu lar season). Farmers were asked to state if they sell (usually) circumstances), or if they are inclined to engage in spot mar ket type of exchange relationships. The respondents were informed that the exchange needed to extend over a period of at least one year to be considered as repeated exchange with one buyer. This operationalisation is consistent with the empirical work of John and Weitz (1988) and Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) who used similar measures. We use a binary variable to measure the level of repeated exchange to one/few partners. production. These investments can be diverted to alternative uses only at a substantial cost. We argue that the more farm ers specialise in milk production as their main agricultural investments (e.g. stables), the more their assets are special ised to the exchange relationship (e.g. quality requirements, milk source and type, storage and transport requirements).
giannis et al. (2008) found that farm and farmers' charac duction, farm income and debt affect the market channels choice of the small ruminant milk producers. Similar results were obtained by Bardhana et al. (2012) . Following Dries number of small ruminant heads and measure it as a loga rithm of this number in order to linearise the relationship and avoid heteroscedasticity.
: Consistent with the reasoning of Anderson and included two items that measure the mutuality of trust and two others that measure behavioural trust. Each item is struct yielded a Cronbach Alpha of 0.829. Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) operation 
Controls
Bargaining power of buyers
• The farmer operates in a region characterised by the presence of large buyers , 1 = farmer conducts business in a region charac conducts business in a region characterised by presence of small dairies Cow milk production
• The farmer is engaged in production and selling of cow milk , 1 = income from cow milk, 0 = no income from cow milk Source: own construction uncertainty related to pricing and the new product introduc tion. However, in our case, farmers' uncertainty is also closely related to the volumes of milk bought by the processor. Based on this reasoning, we operationalise the construct using three items: uncertainty regarding volume, price and product speci The Cronbach Alpha for this construct (0.793) is acceptable.
Controls
Fischer (2013) argues that equal power distribution leads to sustainable relation ships. Hence, strong bargaining power from buyers might presence of large dairies and their strong purchasing power might mitigate the farmers' perception of volume uncer ships. Consequently, we do not hypothesise a direction for this variable in our model, but rather include it as a control variable.
: Our research is focused on farmers engaged in small ruminant (goat and sheep) milk produc tion. However, many farmers produce cow milk too. Using production of cow milk might motivate farmers to build
Empirical model
A binary logistic regression model is used to assess the relationships. This model was selected considering the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. This model has the following form:
( 1) where P i , the probability that the supplier i is engaged in -P i , the probability that the sup plier i engages in spot market exchange; a, a constant; x i , z i , assets, trust and uncertainty; and i , c i , vectors of parameters to be estimated. (2) The odds ratio for the case at hand should be interpreted as follows: one unit increase -says -in the level of uncer tainty increases by the ratio of probability that supplier ity that farmer does engage in spot market exchange.
Construct validity for the two perceptual independent variables
We performed a factor analysis with varimax rotation to test the validity of our perceptual independent variables (Annex). The results for trust design variable loaded reason ings were above the acceptable standard of 0.32 proposed by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) . After the validity tests, we concluded that the measures could be accepted to test the hypotheses.
Variables correlations and multicollinearity
are no problems with multicollinearity.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The average size of the small ruminants' herd is small, around 87 animals ( Table 2 ). There is a strong variability farmers trust their buyers at a personal level (behaviour trust) but are uncertain about price and quality requirements due to environment factors that affect both parties. Hence, we can role in the overall level of uncertainty perceived by farmers.
Of the 315 farmers, 173 (56 per cent) engage in spot tionships with dairy owners and managers (Table 3) . These data suggest a strong reluctance among farmers to coordinate with their buyers, showcasing the lack of coordination and resulting challenges in the dairy and livestock sector. These results appear to be consistent across the regions included in the survey. The only outlier is the region of Berat. This is one of the regions renowned for the presence of large proces tor. Erzeni, a large milk processing company, for instance, dence suggests that large milk processors tend to invest more in supply chain coordination than smaller ones. Regression model results: hypotheses tested (Table 5 ). These results suggest that farmers who Specialisation in milk production appears to make farmers more inclined to deal regularly with one buyer, since their investment has limited value in an alternative use compared to smaller farmers who can switch to other activities (e.g. homemade cheese).
Uncertainty and long-term business relationship
As hypothesised, the presence of uncertainty is nega ships (i.e. . The parameter exp (B and engage in spot market type of exchange if uncertainty increases.
Descriptive statistics show that farmers who perceive higher levels of uncertainty tend to engage in spot market (p < 0.05). Of the 176 farmers who engage in spot market exchange, 133 (i.e. around 76.0 per cent) perceive levels of uncertainty above the average, versus only 80 (57.5 per cent) with their buyers. However, despite the expected differences, the level of uncertainty, as explained earlier, is quite high due to market factors.
Trust and sustainable relationships
sustainable relationships (i.e.
. The parameter exp (B) for farmers that trust their buyers are more inclined to engage in higher levels of trust in their buyers compared to those that levels of trust compared to just 29 per cent of farmers that engage in spot market relationships (Table 6 ). Chi square show that our proxy for bargaining power of buyers is posi tionships (exp (B) = 2.521 and (p < 0.001), while the variable standing for a mixed farm (versus a small ruminants farm) producing both sheep and goat milk and cow milk does not Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Dyer and et al., 2006) .
actions can be viewed as the right conditions for trust between business partners to grow. Repeated exchange can allow for informal control through embeddedness (Granovetter, 1992) leading to higher levels of trust as suggested by Heide and John (1990) . Hence, to understand better the causality of this relationship longitudinal, studies are needed. Our research found that uncertainty is a strong predictor ships. We argue that perceived behaviour uncertainty may have a detrimental effect on exchange relationships (see Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Suh and Kwonb, 2006) , leading farm ers to opt for a spot market exchange. Furthermore, in par ticular periods of time and some local contexts, uncertainty might not be related to buyers' behaviour but rather to market dynamics. Price volatility can affect the exchange relation ship as suggested by some scholars (e.g. Klein, 1996; Joshi and Campbell, 2003) leading farmers to break down the rela tionship. Unfortunately, in our study we are not able to sepa rate the different effects of environment from behavioural uncertainty. Further research might address this shortfall.
liamson, 1983) and empirical research (e.g. Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Dyer, 1996; Banterle et al., 2006) . Flock size Dries and Swinnen, 2010), constituting also an important factor that determines farmers' willingness to engage in represent an 'insurance policy' that provide protection from the risk of not being able to sell high volumes of milk to dair ies. On the contrary, smaller farmers whose small quantity have the 'luxury' to engage in spot market exchange. Finally, our study appears to corroborate the role of buyer's bargaining power on exchange relationship. The result shows that farmers operating in areas characterised by the presence We can take some licence to speculate on the reasons behind Large buyers tend to pay on time and in full. Furthermore, smaller ones). Finally, having a strong purchasing power and large market share appears to serve as a guarantee for farmers. However, buyers' characteristics, behaviour and their role in exchange relationships should be further investigated.
Our results can help dairy owners/managers to build improve the outcome of their exchange relationships. They should consider improving communication and increasing information exchange with farmers in order to reduce uncer tainty and build trust for both partners. On the buyers' side, especially large dairies, improved coordination and durability of the exchange relationship can mitigate volume uncertainty during the low season. Milk can be found relatively easily for new suppliers, hence increasing volumes, during the low season. Anecdotal evidence from the region of Berat and the results of our research indicate that large dairies in these areas
As a result, they can manage volume uncertainties better. On the farmers' side, the role of the buyer in mitigating uncertain ties, related to both behaviour and environment, can have ben
show that when farmers perceive low levels of uncertainty and high levels of trust, they tend to engage with one buyer only in durable relationships. Hence, price and quality speci supply and demand changes, such as seasonal production surpluses. Anecdotal evidence suggests that changes in the quality standards and price are not a rare phenomenon. Such practices adopted by dairy owners may lead to a farmer's lack
Buyers should make clear their terms and communicate with farmers on eventual changes in the market prices.
the government to improve its policy instruments aiming of paying a price premium per litre delivered to dairies and milk collection points based on recorded transactions 1 may also be used for incentivising commercial (larger) farmers to establish closer relationships with buyers. A support scheme based on payments per head of small ruminants (minimum 100 to maximum 300 heads per farm) has been one of the main components in the government budgetary support (Volk, 2017) . Conditioning this direct producer support scheme to the application of formal transactions between farmers and dairy owners might result in better chain coordi nation, formalisation of the sector and improved food safety.
This study has some limitations that caution against gen entirely relevant to the rest of the dairy sector (relying on the cow milk). Secondly, our model explains a relatively small part of the variability of exchange relationships, focusing on only three, albeit important, variables. Future research should consider other explanatory variables related to exchange relationships in the dairy sector such as physical 1 mining basic criteria, sectors to be supported and measures of support, for year 2016".
